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Abstract: Frederick Engels’s Anti-Dühring was the most important theoretical response to the 
emerging reformist tendencies within European socialism in the nineteenth century. It also 
proved to be Engels’s most influential, and controversial work. Because it is, as Hal Draper 
points out, “the only more or less systematic presentation of Marxism” by either by Marx or 
Engels, anyone wanting to reinterpret Marx must first detach it from his seal of approval. It is 
thus around Anti-Dühring and related texts that debates about the relationship of Marx to 
“Engelsian” Marxism have tended to focus. This essay re-engages with debates about Engels’s 
mature work with a view to unpicking his contribution to Marxism from caricatured criticisms 
of his thought. 
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Engels’s ironically titled Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science was the most important 
theoretical response to the emerging reformist tendencies within European socialism prior to 
the publication of Rosa Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike and Lenin’s The State and Revolution. 
Universally known as Anti-Dühring, this book proved to be Engels’s most influential work, 
winning the cadre of the SPD to Marxism during the period of Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws.1 
It is also his most controversial work. This is in large part because it is “the only more or less 
systematic presentation of Marxism” by either by Marx or Engels; and as such anyone wanting 
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to reinterpret Marx must first detach it from his seal of approval.2 It is thus around Anti-
Dühring, alongside the much shorter three chapter except from it, Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific, and other related works most notably Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical 
German Philosophy and the unfinished and unpublished in his lifetime Dialectics of Nature 
that debates about the relationship of Marx to (“Engelsian”) Marxism have tended to focus.  
John Holloway, for instance, has argued that while it would be wrong to over-emphasise 
the differences between Marx and Engels, this is more to the detriment of Marx – particularly 
the Marx of the 1859 preface - than it is to Engels’s credit. According to Holloway, “Science, 
in the Engelsian tradition which became known as ‘Marxism’, is understood as the exclusion 
of subjectivity”.3 Holloway is honest enough to recognise that, as Sebastiano Timpanaro put it, 
“everyone who begins by representing Engels in the role of a banalizer and distorter of Marx’s 
thought inevitably ends by finding many of Marx’s own statements too ‘Engelsian’”.4 Paul 
Thomas, by contrast, wants to spare Marx from the consequences of his criticisms of Engels: 
“Engels’s post-Marxian doctrines owe little or nothing to the man he called his mentor”; 
indeed, the “conceptual chasm separating Marx’s writings from the arguments set forth in Anti-
Dühring is such that even if Marx was familiar with these arguments, he disagreed with” 
Engels’s view that “human beings … are in the last analysis physical objects whose motion is 
governed by the same general laws that regulate the motion of all matter”.5 Terrell Carver has 
produced what is probably the most scholarly version of the divergence thesis. He argues that 
whereas Marx saw “science as an activity important in technology and industry”, Engels 
viewed “its importance for socialists in terms of a system of knowledge, incorporating the 
causal laws of physical science and taking them as a model for a covertly academic study of 
                                                          
2 Draper, Hal 1977, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution Vol. I, New York: Monthly Review Press, 24 
3 Holloway, John 2010, Change the World Without Taking Power, London: Pluto, 121 
4 Timpanaro, Sebastiano. 1975. On Materialism. London: Verso, 77 
5 Thomas, Paul 2008, Marxism and Scientific Socialism. London: Routledge, 39; 9; 43 
history, ‘thought’ and, somewhat implausibly, current politics”.6 Like Thomas, Carver 
disapproves of this approach and believes it separates Marx from Engels. Moreover, he 
explains Marx’s indulgence towards Engels thus: “perhaps he felt it easier, in view of their 
long friendship, their role as leading socialists, and the usefulness of Engels’s financial 
resources, to keep quiet and not interfere in Engels’s work, even if it conflicted with his own”.7 
Unfortunately, Marx’s silence allowed Engels’s thought to take on the mantle of orthodoxy 
first in the SPD before subsequently becoming “the basis of official philosophy and history in 
the Soviet Union”.8 This was disastrous as Engels was either “unaware (or had he forgotten?)” 
that whereas The German Ideology had transcended the opposition between materialism and 
idealism “his materialism … was close in many respects to being a simple reversal of 
philosophical idealism and a faithful reflection of natural sciences as portrayed by positivists”.9 
In short, Carver, Thomas and Holloway condemn Engels for having reduced Marx’s 
conception of revolutionary praxis to a version of the mechanical materialism and political 
fatalism against which Marx had rebelled in the 1840s.  
Superficially at least this is a curious complaint as Engels’s engagement with Dühring 
was explicitly intended as a defence of revolutionary political practice against Dühring’s 
moralistic reformism – and no less an interventionist Marxist than Lenin described it as “a 
handbook for every class-conscious worker”.10 Though Dühring is only remembered today as 
the object of Engels’s polemic, in the 1870s he did threaten to oust Marxism from its position 
of influence within the SPD. It was for this reason that, in 1875, Wilhelm Liebknecht requested 
that Marx and Engels rise to the challenge of Dühring’s growing ascendency within the Party. 
After a brief exchange of letters between the two old friends, Engels was tasked with making 
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the reply.11 Engels’ engagement with Dühring had nothing to do with the intrinsic merits of his 
work; but was rather intended to counter his damaging influence on the Party.12 Commenting 
on this influence, Marx wrote to Sorge: 
 
“In Germany a corrupt spirit is asserting itself in our party … with Dühring and his 
‘admirers’ … who want to give socialism a ‘higher, idealistic’ orientation, i.e. substitute 
for the materialist basis … a modern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternité”.13 
 
This was a political problem of the first importance, and Carver’s account of Marx’s tolerance 
towards Engels’s apparently wrong-headed response is utterly implausible. Apart from 
anything else, while there is no evidence that Marx disagreed with Engels, there is plenty of 
evidence to the contrary. In the first instance, although Marx wasn’t in the best of health when 
Anti-Dühring was written, this was between five and seven years prior to his death and he was, 
while far from his peak, nonetheless intellectually active. Second, Engels claimed that he had 
read drafts of each chapter to Marx before sending them off for publication.14 It is conceivable, 
as Carver suggests, that Engels may have lied about this. But, the fact that Marx read at least 
the published version of the book is the most obvious interpretation of his criticisms to Wilhelm 
Bracke of the fragmentary way it was being serialised in Vorwärts, his grumblings about the 
quality of other materials published alongside it in the newspaper, and his decision to send a 
copy of the book to Moritz Kaufmann with a note suggesting that it was “very important for a 
true appreciation of German Socialism”.15 That he also wrote a foreword to the 1880 French 
                                                          
11 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Exchange of letters May 24-28 1876, MECW 45, 118-124 
12 Frederick Engels “Letter to Marx” 25 July 1876, MEW45, 131 
13 Karl Marx “Letter to Sorge” 19 October 1877, MECW 45, 283 
14 Karl Marx “letter to Engels” May 25 1876 MECW 45, 119-120; Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring, MECW 25, 9 
15 Karl Marx “Letters to Bracke and Kaufmann 11 April 1877, 23 Oct 1877, 3 Oct 1878, MECW 45, 218; 285; 
333-4 
edition of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, which is made up of chapters from Anti-Dühring, 
should really silence rumours to the contrary.16 Against Carver’s rather forced attempt to 
suggest that Marx had little or no knowledge of its content, Steve Rigby is surely right to argue 
that it is almost inconceivable that Marx would either have left it unread or having read it left 
it uncriticised if he disagreed with it in important ways.17 This conclusion is easier to accept 
once we recognise the misguided nature of Carver’s and Thomas’s interpretations of the 
substance of Engels’s mature thought. 
Substantively, Engels’s response to Dühring involved a return to the themes of The 
German Ideology, the text in which Marx and Engels defined communism as “practical 
materialism” - the revolutionary sublation of idealism and materialism.18 And like its 
predecessor, Anti-Dühring was intended as a defence of revolutionary politics against the 
sterile abstractions of moralistic reformism. But whereas The German Ideology was a creative 
work of self-clarification, Anti-Dühring interrupted Engels’s creative engagement with natural 
science; even though it was enriched by themes from his unfinished Dialectics of Nature.  
The relationship of Dialectics of Nature to Anti-Dühring is another bone of contention 
amongst proponents of the divergence thesis. Carver, for instance, suggests that Engels kept 
Dialectics of Nature from Marx because he was “canny enough to avoid creating disagreements 
with Marx”. Again, this is a very dubious claim. Marx actually wrote to Liebknecht saying that 
Engels’s engagement with Dühring “entails considerable sacrifice on his part, as he had to 
break off an incomparably more important piece of work [Dialectics of Nature] to that end”, 
while Gareth Stedman Jones has pointed out that the manuscript of Engels’s Dialectics of 
Nature includes “comments in Marx’s handwriting”.19 More to the point, despite the often 
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dismissive tone of Engels’s critics, the arguments presented in Dialectics of Nature exhibit a 
direct continuity from the claim made in The German Ideology that  
 
“We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from 
two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides 
are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent 
on each other so long as men exist”.20  
 
Additionally, the evidence suggests that Marx shared Engels’s views about the relationship 
between the social and natural sciences: indeed, he described the theoretical sections from Anti-
Dühring published in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific as “an introduction to scientific 
socialism”.21 And Marx was keenly aware that Engels was, as Hilary Putnam notes, “one of 
the most scientifically learned men of his century”.22 
Anti-Dühring’s key argument is set forth in its opening paragraph. Whereas Dühring 
claimed that socialism was “the natural system of society” underpinned by a “universal 
principle of justice”,23 Engels insisted that as a concrete historical movement “Modern 
socialism” was inconceivable prior to the emergence of modern capitalist social relations: it 
“is, in its essence, the direct product of the recognition, on the one hand, of the class 
antagonisms existing in the society of today between proprietors and non-proprietors, between 
capitalists and wage-workers; on the other hand, of the anarchy existing in production”.24  
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Thus, contra Dühring, Engels suggested that “to a make a science of socialism, it had 
first to be placed upon a real basis”.25 If this had happened with the emergence of the modern 
working class, from this moment onwards socialism had been transformed from an abstract 
and empty ideal into a concrete historical possibility. Engels’s socialism was thus a novel, 
emergent force with a corresponding emergent value system. So, whereas Dühring claimed that 
morality stands as a “special … absolutely immutable … truth … above history”,26 Engels 
countered that though some eternal truths did exist, these were few and far between and usually 
took the form of platitudes. He distinguished between three levels of scientific enterprise: the 
study of inanimate objects, the study of living organisms, and the study of human history. If 
exact, universal truths are most likely to occur in the first group, in reality because the sciences 
relating to these areas are replete with competing hypotheses such truths are “remarkably rare”. 
The situation with the regards the second group is even less certain, while, in the third group 
where “repetition of condition is the exception and not the rule”, knowledge becomes 
“essentially relative”. Consequently, it is close to impossible to talk of “immutable truths” in 
respect of human societies.27 And the contested nature of the human sciences were magnified 
when applied to the study of ethics.28 
Though Engels believed that the profound historical variation of morality should 
consign the idea of transhistorical moral truths to the dustbin of history, this did not entail that 
he embraced a form of nihilism. In fact, the opposite is the case: this insight actually 
underpinned his value system. His rejection of the idea of timeless moral precepts informed 
the questions he posed of contemporary morality. Which moral standpoint at the present 
juncture, he asked, “contains the maximum elements promising permanence which, in the 
present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future”? His answer was 
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“proletarian morality”, or the system of values congruent with the struggle of the modern 
working class for freedom against alienation.29  
Clearly, Engels’s conception of proletarian morality is rooted in sectional concerns that 
emerged as a historical phenomenon alongside and in opposition to modern capitalism. 
Nevertheless, it is not a mere sectional interest: by creating a world system of universal 
interconnection capitalism created for the first time the basis for a universal interest. 
Meanwhile workers’ struggles against alienation had emerged as the practical means to realise 
this universal human interest. Engels provides a useful historical sketch of the roots of this 
conflict. In medieval society both production and appropriation were individualised and local. 
This parochial moment in history meant that the idea of a universal human interest was simply 
meaningless. With the development of capitalism, however, production became ever more 
interconnected and concentrated. But if capitalism had thus transformed production from an 
individual to a social system, appropriation remained privatised. Thus on top of the structural 
antagonism between capitalists and workers, there existed an antagonism between social 
production and individual appropriation. The intertwining of these contradictions suggested 
that the coming “proletarian revolution” simultaneously represented a sectional class conflict 
against capital and a struggle for the general interest against capitalist alienation: “this act of 
universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern proletariat”.30 
Proletarian morality is therefore an emergent property within history intimately linked 
to a specific group that, nevertheless, represents, for the first time in history, a real movement 
for the general human interest. Engels defended this proposition through a concrete application 
of what he called the “dialectical method used by Marx”.31 Indeed, Anti-Dühring is, amongst 
many other things, a powerful defence of this method. Engels felt he had to make such a 
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defence to counter the seeming power of Dühring’s analytical argument from first principles 
to transhistorical conclusions.32 
By contrast with this method, Engels argued that although modern science from the 
middle of the fifteenth century onwards marked a profound breakthrough in knowledge, it did 
so at a cost: the analytical method of dissecting problems into their constituent parts informed 
a strong tendency for modern science to study these parts in isolation. This assumption is 
problematic because it is impossible to comprehend real movement except at the level of 
conceptual wholes. Conversely, the study of isolated parts, even when brought into relation 
with each other, lends itself to a “narrow, metaphysical mode of thought”.33 Engels borrowed 
the term “metaphysical” from Hegel, and like him used it in a disparaging way to describe the 
one-sidedly abstract and static conceptions of reality associated especially with classical 
empiricism.34 Whatever their undoubted strengths, the metaphysicians tended to squeeze real 
motion and qualitative change out of their image of reality: and by recombining constituent 
parts as externally related monads, the metaphysicians remained trapped in a narrow empiricist 
conception of causality.35 If this approach more-or-less fitted with the cutting edge of scientific 
progress in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its limits became increasingly apparent in 
light of further scientific advances in the nineteenth century.  
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was merely the most important of a 
series of scientific discoveries that pointed in the direction of dialectical thinking. According 
to Engels, Darwin “dealt the metaphysical conception of nature the heaviest blow” because he 
showed in practice that a real scientific understanding of nature is impossible without a 
conception of the mediated and contradictory essence of wholes. Engels thus suggested that 
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“nature”, especially as it was understood through the most advanced parts of science in the 
nineteenth century “is the proof of dialectics”.36 This is because modern science has shown, 
contra the metaphysicians, that “Motion is the mode of existence of matter”.37 Galvano Della 
Volpe comments: “the correctly anti-empiricist and anti-positivist Engels … noted that it was 
impossible to prove the evolution of the species through induction alone” and that concepts 
like species, genus and class had been “rendered fluid” by Darwin; becoming “relative or 
dialectical concepts”.38 This is why John O’Neill is right to argue, against numerous arguments 
to the contrary,39 that Engels was not a positivist.40   
If Darwinism was the high-water mark of the scientific revolution that underpinned the 
movement from a metaphysical to a dialectic viewpoint in the study of the natural world, this 
process was complemented within classical German philosophy through the work of Hegel. In 
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels argued that “the true 
significance and the revolutionary character of Hegelian philosophy” lay in its recognition that 
truth was  
 
“no longer a collection of ready-made dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, 
had merely to be learned by heart. Truth now lay in the process of cognition itself, in 
the long historical development of science, which ascends from lower to ever higher 
levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth, a 
point at which it can proceed no further, where it has nothing more to do than to sit 
back and gaze in wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained”.41  
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 Unfortunately, or so Engels claimed, in his mature writings Hegel incoherently combined this 
insight with the suggestion of the “absolute truth” of his system.42 In the wake of Hegel’s death, 
the contradiction between these two aspects of his thought became manifest as a division 
between those of his followers who embraced his conservative system and their left-wing 
“Young Hegelian” critics who extended his revolutionary method.43 This process initially 
culminated with the publication of Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity. Feuerbach argued that 
religious ideas were mental reflections of real human powers, and thus by worshipping God 
people were kneeling before an alienated image of their own powers. Similarly, because Hegel 
conceived the real world as an emanation of absolute spirit, his system was but a variant of 
religious alienation. The simple and profound point caught the imagination of the German 
philosophical left in the 1840s, and for a moment, or so Engels claimed, “everyone” was a 
Feuerbachian.  
But Hegelianism suffered a strange defeat: the Feuerbachians discarded Hegel rather 
than work through his contradictions.44 In their attempt to break free of the limitations of 
Feuerbachian “True Socialism” Marx and Engels were compelled to work through these 
contradictions. Commenting on this process, Engels wrote that while Feuerbach and the 
materialists were right in respect of “the great basic question of all … concerning the relation 
of thinking and being”, mechanical materialism failed to recognise that though being 
determines consciousness, this is not a mechanical process: because “everything which 
motivates men must pass through the brains”, and because the human mind plays an active part 
in the process of cognition these determinations, whereas in nature “laws assert themselves 
unconsciously”, in the social world they are applied “consciously”.45 Thus “the Hegelian 
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dialectic was placed upon its head”: consciousness was, as Hegel had argued, an active and 
never-ending process of cognition, but, contra Hegel, consciousness was best understood as an 
aspect of nature making sense of, and acting upon, its material determinants to meet its 
consciously desired ends.46 This is the philosophical underpinnings of the claim that people 
make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing, and it is the reason why Engels 
insisted that “the German working-class movement is the heir to German classical 
philosophy”.47  
So while Engels argued that the “epoch-making” power of the Hegelian method lay in 
its recognition that “for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is 
represented as a process”,48 he simultaneously insisted that this insight was undermined by 
Hegel’s idealism. By inverting the relationship between consciousness and reality, Hegel was 
unable to grasp real historical change: his system was consequently a “colossal miscarriage”. 
This criticism suggests that it would be wrong to assume that Engels imposed Hegelian 
categories on nature. Though Engels drew on Hegel, his understanding of natural evolution 
involved an explicit break with his mentor’s system.49 Specifically, he argued that to escape 
both the contradictions of Hegel’s system and the limitations of Feuerbach’s materialism, he 
and Marx had, in the 1840s, gravitated towards a new dialectical materialist method of 
analysis.50  
By deploying both materialist and dialectical terminology in their work, Marx51 and 
Engels opened themselves up to a century-long tendency for their critics to dismiss them as 
either mechanical materialists or dialectical obscurantists. If the charge that their “practical 
materialism” was but a rehash of eighteenth century mechanical materialism doesn’t hold 
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water, the actual relationship between their dialectical method and Hegel’s approach is much 
more complex than is implied by superficial similarities. Indeed, to coquette with Hegelian 
categories may well mark an homage paid, but it certainly doesn’t imply agreement.52  
Unfortunately, there is a problem with Engels’s claim that while Marx rejected the 
political conclusions of Hegel’s conservative system he embraced his dialectical method. As 
many scholars have pointed out, Hegel’s system cannot be separated from his method. 
Fortunately, this claim is less problematic for Engels than these critics suggest.53 Beneath his 
superficial comments about the distinction between Hegel’s method and his system, Engels did 
in fact recognise that the Hegelian method was as flawed as was its system. Thus he wrote: 
because, “according to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept … in its 
Hegelian form this method was no use”.54 He consequently ridiculed Dühring for committing 
“the blunder of identifying Marxian dialectics with the Hegelian”.55 In fact, when Engels wrote 
that Marx had taken up Hegel’s method but not his system he is best understood as making the 
more limited claim that, for Marx, as for Hegel at his best, the process of searching for truth 
would never be “final and complete”. But whereas the Hegelian concept developed 
deductively, for Marx conceptual deepening emerged through the successive introduction of 
more complex determinations as he sought to raise theory to the concrete level of practice.56 
From this perspective, as Allen Wood points out, Engels’s comments on the method/system 
distinction is “not necessarily wrong, but it is superficial and possibly misleading”.57  
But if Engels could have avoided much misunderstanding had he detailed the 
differences between his (and as he claimed Marx’s) method on the one side and Hegel’s on the 
other, this gap in his argument is understandable as a consequence of its main thrust being 
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elsewhere - to counter Dühring’s belief that his system was “final and complete”. Commenting 
on Dühring’s claim that the idea that contradictions existed in reality was “absurd”, Engels 
accepted that the logical criticism of internal contradictions was true enough, but only within 
the narrow parameters and when viewing things in isolation and at rest. An adequate 
understanding of change, by contrast, demanded that theory move beyond these parameters. 
According to Engels, to grasp the reality of motion it was important to recognise the existence 
of contradictions in reality.58  
Far from evidencing the absurdity of his thought, Marx’s coquetting with the Hegelian 
concept of contradiction was his way of trying to cognise movement in history.59 In relation to 
this claim, Scott Meikle notes that the key to Marx’s critique of Ricardo was not his criticism 
of the latter’s ahistorical conception of capitalism but rather lay in his claim that Ricardo had 
failed to conceptualise value as a specifically capitalist form. This conceptual critique had 
profound political implications: Marx insisted that it was only on the basis of a proper 
appreciation of the contradictory unity of the use and exchange values of commodities that 
capitalism could adequately be understood in its dynamic, antagonistic and historically 
transient essence. So, to move beyond the negative claim that capitalism wasn’t natural to the 
positive claim that it was pregnant with its alternative demanded that it be conceptualised as a 
contradictory unity of diverse elements.60  
From this perspective, Marx’s conceptual architecture deepens and changes as more 
and more diverse elements are integrated into the concept of the concrete totality as a 
“concentration of many determinations”. And though Engels may have misunderstood the 
value form,61 he clearly understood, as he wrote in the preface to the third volume of Capital, 
that where “things and their mutual relations are conceived not as fixed but rather as changing, 
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their mental images too, i.e. concepts, are also subject to change and reformulation”.62 As Dill 
Hunley writes: “Engels did not speak of ‘rising from the abstract to the concrete’ … But a 
careful reading of his comments shows his little-appreciated understanding of the overall role 
theoretical paradigms played in the thought process. In the introduction to Anti-Dühring and 
his comments to Conrad Schmidt, Engels once again expressed views very close to those of 
Marx without using his precise wording”.63  
This conception of reality illuminates the key difference between the dialectical and 
non-dialectical approaches: the former unlike the latter points to the possibility of qualitative 
change because of the way it views relations as internal to things rather than as expressions of 
external interactions between them. Bertell Ollman insists that Marx and Engels were in 
agreement on this methodological issue.64 
In Anti-Dühring and more so in Dialectics of Nature, Engels explored those 
characteristics of dialectical thought that facilitated an understanding of the real in its fully 
dynamic essence: the way in which, as Marx put it, “the ideal is nothing but the material world 
reflected in the minds of man, and translated into forms of thought”.65 Engels’s exposition of 
this method included his infamous three “laws of dialectics”: “The law of the transformation 
of quantity into quality and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law 
of the negation of the negation”.66 A sea of ink has been spilt debating these “laws”, and most 
of it generates more heat than light. Part of the problem is that Engels gave illustrative examples 
of the laws which were not entirely successful. Moreover, the laws as stated - and it should be 
remembered that they were stated most explicitly in the incomplete and unpublished 
manuscript of Dialectics of Nature (where they are mentioned in Anti-Dühring, by contrast, 
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Engels merely gave examples of two of the laws as concrete counters to Dühring’s arguments 
against Marx) – are general almost to the point of banality. Nonetheless, they do illuminate 
important characteristics of reality which Dühring and contemporary analytical philosophers 
miss.67 
Engels is right that both nature and society are in a constant process of flux, and that if 
we are to escape the need for some external stimulus for change we need an account of 
immanent tendencies to change. To follow formal logic in demanding a law of non-
contradiction is all well and good, but in and of itself it doesn’t get us very far. To understand 
the process of natural evolution, for instance, requires some account of a dynamic internal to 
nature. If Engels’s concept of the transformation from quantity to quality allows us to 
conceptualise speciation as a process, his model is dependent on an account of things not as 
isolated and fixed entities but rather as processes constituted through their internal relations.  
It is to these internal relations that Engels refers when he deploys the Hegelian concept 
of the interpenetration of opposites: he insists that if we are to conceive real concrete wholes 
in movement they need to be understood in all their contradictory richness. Conversely, 
attempts to make sense of these whole using the category of identity tend to an impoverished 
conception of change.68 Capital, by contrast, is a detailed instance of the dialectical method at 
work: its aim is to grasp the totality as a rich interplay between these determinations and 
relations in a way that “comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential 
connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending”.69  
As to the notion of the “negation of the negation”, which Dühring criticised as a 
“dialectical crutch” that added nothing to Marx’s otherwise useful sketch of the primitive 
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accumulation of capital. Engels’s reply was effectively a rehearsal of the power of the obstetric 
metaphor through which existing society is viewed as being pregnant with its alternative. He 
suggested that as capitalism evolved there developed a concentration of wealth on the one side 
and misery on the other - a process that creates within capitalism the potential for revolutionary 
transformation of capitalism into a new social formation.70 Far from imposing Hegelian 
categories on reality, Engels insisted that Marx generalised the concept of the negation of the 
negation from his concrete analysis of capitalism: he deployed this concept to make sense of 
the way that capitalism not only dehumanises people (the negation) but also of how, in rebelling 
against this condition, these dehumanised people create networks of solidarity that point 
towards a positive alternative to capitalism (the negation of the negation).71 This was a specific 
example of Engels’s more general claim that his dialectical laws, far from being imposed on 
reality, were generalised from the study of reality: “It is … from the history of nature and 
human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted”.72  
If the new materialism insisted that nature could best be understood as a dynamic unity 
of its myriad parts, it also recognised that humanity itself had a history. Clearly it is impossible 
to deny human history as a trivial succession of events – one damn thing after another as 
Toynbee complained. The new materialism departed from the old by starting from a 
recognition of the profundity of Hegel’s claim that the Greeks were different from the moderns: 
social evolution was a reality. By recognising this insight, the new materialism was historical 
as well as dialectical: whereas the “old materialism looked upon all previous history as a crude 
heap of irrationality and violence; modern materialism sees in it the process of evolution of 
humanity, and aims at discovering the laws thereof”.73 It is only from this perspective that the 
reality of modern socialism could be grasped as a truly novel phenomenon congruent with the 
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emergence of capitalist society. According to Engels, Marx’s greatness lay in the fact that he 
had pierced beneath the surface appearance of reality to reveal the historical novelty of the 
inner essence of the new capitalist system. 
So whereas truth and morality were for Dühring absolutes, Engels insisted that truth 
was better understood as a process of becoming. He and Marx had made precisely this point in 
The German Ideology. By contrast with modern liberal political theory’s axiomatic assumption 
of a transhistorical “man”, the starting point of their analysis was real concrete historical men 
and women as they had emerged at a specific historical juncture. As biological beings these 
people were products of natural selection, but as social beings they were also products of 
cultural evolution. This insight, alongside his keen sense of history, underpinned Engels’s 
attempt to illuminate the obstetric metaphor. Borrowing from Marx, he argued that with the 
emergence of the modern working class, society becomes pregnant with the possibility of 
socialism.74 If this metaphor illuminates both the dynamic nature of social relations and the 
concrete nature of Marx and Engels’s ideals,75 like any metaphor it tends to absurdity if pushed 
too far; societies are not pregnant women and social change does not occur with a biological 
inevitability. But deployed sensibly, it is the methodological basis of Lukács’s claim that the 
Marxist dialectic underpinned Marx and Engels’s recognition of “the present as a historical 
problem”.76   
Despite some clumsy formulations, Engels’s deployment of the concept of the 
interpenetration of opposites does suggest that socialism is a historical potentiality rather than 
an inevitability: Rosa Luxemburg’s interpretation of Anti-Dühring as a call to arms is rooted 
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in his claim society is a contradictory whole capable of moving towards “ruin, or revolution”.77 
If this interventionist reading of Engels seems odd to those who assume he embraced a 
mechanical and empiricist conception of science, once we recognise that the whole thrust of 
his argument in Anti-Dühring is that mechanical models of science are inadequate, his 
“practical materialism” shines through: he may well have argued that human history remains 
part of natural history, but he was equally explicit that the former should not be subsumed 
within the latter. Thus, he insisted that to move beyond capitalist alienation required political 
intervention: “mere knowledge … is not enough … what is above all necessary … is a social 
act”.78 
This demand for political intervention illuminates both the continuities between Anti-
Dühring and The German Ideology and the nature of Engels’s materialism. By contrast with 
critics such as Meikle who suggest he’d reverted back to a form of mechanical materialism,79 
Engels was adamant that his conception of materialism is, as Sayers and Benton note, non-
reductive.80 Indeed, he insisted an emergentalist conception of nature in which “the transition 
from one form of motion to another [physics to chemistry to biology etc.] always remains a 
leap, a decisive change”.81 Beyond the emergent properties of distinct aspects of nature, Engels 
also insisted that human agency was a further emergent property that could not be mechanically 
reduced to our nature. Thus in Ludwig Feuerbach and End of Classical German Philosophy he 
suggested that:  
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“In nature … there are only blind, unconscious agencies acting upon one another, out of 
whose interplay the general law comes into operation. Of all that happens … nothing 
happens as a consciously desired aim. In the history of society, on the contrary, the actors 
are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working 
towards definite goals; nothing happens without a deliberate intention, without a desired 
aim”.82 
 
If these lines point to the non-reductive core of Engels’s social theory, his analysis of the 
relationship between freedom and necessity show how he simultaneously avoided the opposite 
error of reifying “free will”.83 Again he found Hegel useful here. By contrast with the sterile 
opposition between autonomy and heteronomy, he returned to Hegel’s famous definition of 
freedom as the appreciation of necessity: “Necessity is blind only in so far as it not 
understood”.84 Commenting on this line, Engels wrote “Freedom does not consist in any 
dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the 
possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends”.85 From the 
invention of fire through the industrial revolution and beyond, humanity’s powers of 
understanding and concomitant level of control over nature tended to increase through history. 
Thus the development of humanity’s productive powers underpinned the development of 
human freedom:  
 
“Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a 
control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product 
of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal 
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kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step 
forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom”.86 
 
And while Engels’s use of the language of “control” to describe humanity’s relationship with 
nature might suggest a promethean tendency in his thought, he simultaneously insisted that 
humanity’s relationship to nature should be understood dialectically. We relate to nature not 
externally as a power over it, but dialectically through a unity (not identity) of the natural and 
social realms. This meant that he was very much alive to the ecological limits of human activity. 
Indeed, his comments on the unintended consequences of earlier attempts to master nature have 
a very modern ring to them.87  
 
“Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over 
nature … at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a 
conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with 
flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of 
it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to 
learn its laws and apply them correctly”.88 
 
Far from signalling a retreat from the praxis theory of the 1840s to a fatalistic reduction of 
human history to natural history,89 Engels’s discussion of the relation of freedom to necessity 
is best understood as a powerful attempt to locate human agency within nature without 
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subsuming it to nature.90 Freedom, from this perspective, is an emergent property that takes its 
fullest form with the victory of the socialist revolution: “humanity’s leap from the kingdom of 
necessity to the kingdom of freedom”.91 
The evolutionary underpinnings of this argument was most explicitly articulated in 
Engels’s minor masterpiece; The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man 
(1876). This essay, which is arguably the most powerful and certainly the most successful 
section of Dialectics of Nature,92 marks Engels’s most explicit exploration of the emergent 
relationship between cultural and biological evolution through the lens of a critique of Darwin’s 
interpretation of the evolution of modern humans. Whereas Darwin, in The Descent of Man 
(1871), had argued that the decisive moment in the evolution of humanity occurred with the 
development of large brains, Engels suggests that massive brain development followed upon 
the evolution of an upright gait.93 Once the hands of our ape ancestors were no longer primarily 
used to climb, evolutionary advantage moved to favour hands that could work tools. From then 
onwards it was only a matter of time before our ancestors’ hands evolved into something 
resembling those of the modern humans. This fact is of terrific importance because it shows 
that “the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour”.94  
This evolutionary adaptation had profound cultural and biological consequences for the 
further evolution of humanity. Engels argues that labour reinforced existing tendencies towards 
the evolution of social behaviour, up to and including the adaptation of the larynx, facilitating 
the development of language. Finally, labour and language together became the two most 
important stimuli of rapid brain expansion.95 Increased intelligence and technological know-
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how subsequently led to the development of a more varied diet. The broadening of our 
ancestors’ diet, in turn, underpinned further expansions of the brain, which then facilitated the 
conquest of fire and the domestication of livestock.96 The basis for social evolution was 
therefore the natural evolution of an upright gait. As it happens, Engels has been proved right 
and Darwin wrong on this issue.97 Social and natural evolutionary processes from then onwards 
reinforced each other in a positive feedback loop to propel the evolution of our ancestors 
forward towards our modern form. Engels argues that Darwin’s inability to grasp this process 
was a consequence of the “ideological influence” on his thought which tended to demean the 
importance of labour to social history more generally.98  
It has been suggested that The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to 
Man confused Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of evolution. However, I do not think that 
Engels meant that culturally evolved characteristics could be inherited directly, and certainly 
his argument need not be interpreted in that way.99 Rather, he posited a dialectical relationship 
between cultural and natural evolution, whereby an important part of the “natural” 
environment, within which humans compete for survival, is culturally constructed, such that 
cultural structures act as part of the context within which natural selection takes place. 
Moreover, whereas all animals change their environments, human evolution adds something 
new to the mix: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on 
nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite 
preconceived ends”.100 
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Nevertheless, though human knowledge of nature was expanding, including the 
knowledge, from Darwin, of our “oneness with nature” and the senselessness of the opposition 
between “man and nature”, the experience of the nineteenth century showed that the rational 
regulation of the “metabolic interaction between man and the earth” demanded more than 
knowledge.101 “Classical political economy”, precisely because it is “the social science of the 
bourgeoisie” was unable to see beyond the ideological limits of that class. Because “individual 
capitalists are engaged in production and exchange for the sake of immediate profit, only the 
nearest, most immediate results must first be taken into account”. Consequently, so long as a 
profit is made, the long-term and unintended consequences of their actions “do not concern” 
the capitalists. Similarly, classical political economy examines only the immediately intended 
effects of human actions on nature. To realise the potential oneness of our relationship with 
nature demands “a complete revolution in the hitherto existing mode of production, and 
simultaneously a revolution in our whole contemporary social order”.102 So Engels’s insights 
into the emergence of humanity as the most conscious part of nature leads to the conclusion 
that revolution is necessary if the social consequences of this insight are to be realised. This 
revolutionary perspective is best understood as an enriched vision of the practical materialism 
he and Marx had first outlined in The German Ideology.  
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